Concern with the potential effect of bank mergers on small business lending has stemmed from a belief that larger acquirers may be less willing than their smaller targets to be active in the small business lending market. However, we find that in roughly half the commercial and savings bank mergers of the past three years, the acquirer has a larger portfolio share of small business loans than its target; moreover, the most common acquirer of small banks is another small bank. The empirical results support the hypothesis that acquirers tend to recast the target in their own image, causing small business loan portfolio shares of the consolidated bank to converge toward the pre-merger portfolio share of the acquirer. Since acquirers are almost as likely to have larger as smaller shares of small business loans in their portfolios, compared to their targets, this suggests that not all mergers will shrink small business lending; many will actually increase it.
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Bank Consolidation and Small Business Lending: It's Not Just Bank Size That Matters Over the past ten years, the banking industry has experienced significant shrinkage, with the number of commercial and savings banks declining by nearly 30 percent from the end of 1985 to the end of 1995. A major public policy concern stemming from this consolidation is the impact it could have on the availability of loans to small businesses. Small business borrowers traditionally have relied on banks to satisfy their credit needs. While large borrowers increasingly gain direct access to national credit markets by issuing commercial paper and bonds, small business borrowers continue to be bank dependent.
Thus, these borrowers are particularly sensitive to changes in bank regulation or in the structure of the banking industry.
During the current period of rapid bank consolidation, a number of studies have raised concerns that such consolidation may reduce credit availability to small businesses (Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995; Berger and Udell 1996; Keeton 1995 Keeton , 1996 Peek and Rosengren 1995) , though Strahan and Weston (1996) have found no relation between mergers and small business lending. Several factors may be involved in the perception that large banks, made large in part by acquisitions, may not be responsive to the needs of small businesses. First, during the past three years of rapid bank consolidation, large business loans have grown more rapidly than small business loans. Second, small business lending has grown more rapidly at small banks than at large ones. Third, a bank's share of small business loans tends to be inversely related to the size of the institution, as measured by total assets. While none of these factors provides a direct link between bank mergers and reductions in small business lending, they are sufficiently suggestive to require further study.
This paper investigates how mergers influence the willingness of a banking organization to lend to small businesses. We use a survey, conducted annually in the June bank Call Reports since 1993, to examine changes in business loans of $1 million or less for nonfarm, nonresidential and commercial and industrial purposes.
While changes in bank lending to small 1 businesses subsequent to a merger are related to the size of the acquirer, this study finds that the degree to which the bank was committed to small business lending prior to the merger also affects the willingness of the surviving bank to lend to small businesses.
Much of the public attention has been on acquisitions of small banks by large ones, but in fact, the most prevalent type of merger involves the consolidation of two (or more) small banks. Furthermore, in roughly half the mergers, the acquirer has a small business loan portfolio share greater than that of its target; and in approximately half the mergers, small business loans increase rather than decrease during the period immediately after the merger. An increase is more likely to occur if the acquirer is a small bank or if the acquirer has a greater portfolio share of small business loans than its target, as the consolidated bank partially offsets the initial merger-induced decline in its small business loan portfolio share.
The next section examines recent patterns in bank consolidation. The second section describes the data and the empirical tests. The third section provides the empirical results. The final section offers conclusions.
I. Small Business Lending After Mergers
The idea that acquirers in mergers will be less inclined than their targets to lend to small businesses, or that this unique line of business might be less emphasized in the larger consolidated institution, implies that particular types of institutions tend to emphasize lending to small businesses. On the other hand, small business loans may be local-information intensive (Berger and Udell 1995; Peterson and Rajan 1994) , providing a competitive advantage to smaller institutions with closer links to the local community (Nakamura 1994 for banks with more than $3 billion in assets, business loans of $1 million or less account for only about 5 percent of assets and a little over 20 percent of total business lending.
The strong negative correlation between the size of institution and the share of business loans that are small is potentially important, if it is a reflection of willingness to engage in small business lending. The extent to which large acquirer banks retain the portfolios of small loans at their target banks will be affected by the motivation for the merger (Pilloff 1996) . Are acquiring banks most interested in low-cost core deposits, an increased market share, a more balanced geographic coverage of the franchise, or expertise in particular lines of business, including the accumulated stock of private information about small loan customers at these small banks?
That is, are acquirers after the asset side or the liability side of the acquired bank's balance sheet and, if the former, the wholesale or retail lines? Table 1 shows growth rates of assets and total and small business loans, by bank asset size classes, for the three-year period for which bank small business loan data are available.
Each asset size class contains only those banks in the class at the beginning of the period (June 30, 1993) and still reporting (in any size class) at the end of the three-year period. In order to calculate growth rates, the banks must be defined consistently at both the beginning and end of the sample. This has been accomplished by force-merging the data, as of June 30, 1993, of any banks that merged during the subsequent three-year sample period.
Banks with total assets of less than $100 million increased their loans of $1 million or less by 41.9 percent during this period, while the corresponding increase for banks in the largest size class was only 3.0 percent (Table 1 , last column). For the intervening asset size classes, the growth rate also declines as asset size increases. This is in contrast to the growth rate of total assets, which varies across asset size classes within a relatively narrow range. A comparison of the growth rates for total assets and small business loans during this three-year period makes clear that small business loans were an increasing share of assets for the smallest banks at the same time that they were a decreasing share of assets for the largest banks.
Furthermore, this same pattern does not appear in the total business loans data. For the three larger asset size classes, both total business loans and total assets grew at approximately 20 percent, substantially faster than their small business loans. If a bank is designated as an acquirer, the beginning-ofperiod data for the growth rate calculations are constructed by force-merging the acquirer and target data to make the data consistent with the end-of-subperiod data for the consolidated bank. Note that because the table shows the sum of observations for the three one-year subperiods, an individual bank that reported during the entire three-year period would account for three observations, which would be allocated between the acquirer and non-acquirer categories depending on whether the bank made an acquisition during the particular subperiod.
Panel 1 of Table 2 shows that acquirer banks in each of the asset size classes had higher average small business loan portfolio shares, measured relative to assets, than the nonacquirers in the same asset size class. It also shows that the portfolio share of small business loans increased only for the under $100 million asset size class and that except for that class and the $500 million to $1 billion asset class, acquirers had larger declines in small business loan portfolio shares. The change in small business loans, scaled by assets, was generally a decreasing function of bank size, and in all but one asset size class ($500 million to $1 billion), acquirers had a smaller change in small business loans (scaled by assets) than nonacquirer banks in the same size category. Panel 2 shows that the portfolio share of total business loans increased for all asset size categories for both acquirer and non-acquirer banks. This is in sharp contrast to the changes in portfolio shares for small business loans, which show increases only for acquirer and nonacquirer banks under $100 million.
The typical merger pattern that one might expect to see would be an acquirer that is larger than its target bank, with the target having a larger percentage of small business loans in its portfolio than the acquirer bank. Surprisingly, Panel 1 of Table 3a shows that less than one-half of the acquirers in the sample (417 of 872) actually fit this description. This table shows the set of mergers used in the regression sample (to be In only slightly more than half (446 of 872) of the observations is the target's small business loan portfolio share larger than that of the acquirer. Thus, in nearly half the cases (426 of 872), the merger will, at least initially, lower rather than raise the small business loan portfolio share of the surviving bank, compared to its pre-merger share. To the extent that the acquirer bank was at, or near, its desired portfolio share of small business loans prior to the merger, the consolidated bank presumably would prefer to raise rather than lower its small business lending subsequent to the merger. Given the large share of observations with an acquirer having a larger small business loan portfolio share than its target(s), it is not clear that bank consolidation necessarily will reduce small business lending.
Much of the concern with mergers has arisen from the fear that large banks will acquire small banks but will not maintain the target banks' lending relationships with small firms that are dependent on bank credit. Panel 2 of Table 3a shows how the patterns of small business lending subsequent to mergers differ by the size of the acquirer when the target bank is small. The primary acquirers of these small institutions are other small institutions, with only 24 percent of the mergers shown in Panel 2 having an acquirer with more than $300 million in assets.
When the acquirer is a bank with less than $100 million in assets, the acquirer has a larger small business loan portfolio share than the target in 57 percent of the mergers (148 of 261).
Even larger acquirers frequently have a larger small business loan portfolio share than their smaller targets, with 60 percent (118 of 196) of the acquirers in the $100 million to $300 million asset class having larger small business loan portfolio shares than their target(s) and 40 percent (57 of 144) of the acquirers with over $300 million in assets having a larger small business loan portfolio share than their targets. This is consistent with the evidence presented in Panel 1 of Table 2 indicating that acquirer banks tend to have more of a predisposition to emphasize small business lending relative to similarly sized non-acquirer banks. Table 3b shows the patterns of changes in small business The data shown in Tables 3a and 3b suggest that some of the concerns with mergers may not be well founded. First, in roughly half the commercial and savings bank mergers over the past three years, the portfolio share of small business loans of the acquirer rose rather than fell during the period immediately after the merger. Second, in slightly less than half the cases, the acquirer had a larger portfolio share of small business loans than its target(s). Third, most acquisitions of small banks are carried out by small, not large, banks. Finally, only when the acquirer is large and less active in small business lending than its small target(s) is the small business loan portfolio share of the consolidated bank much more likely to decline than to rise immediately following the merger.
II. Data and Methodology
To determine if mergers affect small business lending, it is first necessary to establish a detailed structure file of bank mergers and accurately date the mergers. This study uses the Federal Reserve System bank identification numbers used in the National Information Center (NIC) bank structure transformation file and compares them to the list of banks filing Call Reports, quarter by quarter. In each quarter, the set of banks no longer filing a Call Report is identified. This set of banks is then compared to the set of banks appearing in the transformations The data set is constructed based on the one-year subperiods defined by the 1993: II, 1994 :II, 1995 :II, and 1996 Reports that provide information on small business loans held by banks. A given bank in the sample may be in one of two categories. The "clean bank" sample includes those banks that reported at both the beginning and the end of the one-year subperiod and made no acquisitions during that subperiod. The set of "acquirer banks" are those that reported both at the beginning and the end of the subperiod and were involved in at least some mergers, with none of the acquired entities being failed institutions, bridge banks, or partial acquisitions, and for which bank Call Report data were available for all acquired entities. For reasons described earlier, we do not include banks with ownership changes during the one-year window.
Because the merger data set is viewed from the perspective of the acquirer, all acquisitions by a particular bank within a subperiod are aggregated. Thus, if Bank A acquires three separate banks at different times within a one-year subperiod, the series of mergers will be recorded as a single observation and the data for all four banks will be force-merged as of the beginning of the subperiod for comparison with the end-ofsubperiod data for the surviving (consolidated) bank. Similarly, if a sequence of merger acquisitions occurs within one of the one-year subperiods, the sequence is compressed into a single transaction.
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Methodology
The analysis is based on a specification that attempts to explain the growth in a bank's small business loan portfolio calculated over a one-year period corresponding to the subperiods between June Call Reports, controlling for bank-specific characteristics, regional banking market characteristics, and regional economic activity. By including banks that made no merger acquisitions during the subperiod as well as banks that did make merger acquisitions in the same equation, one can test for differences in the growth in small business loan portfolios across these bank categories.
The base regression is of the form:
where SBL refers to the volume of small business loans (those business loans of $1 million or less in value) at bank i and X , 
III. Empirical Results
The regression results are based on a pooled sample that combines observations from each of the one-year subperiods covered by the small business loan survey. The first set of regression results, shown in Table 4 , amplifies the two-way classification of mergers corresponding to the two rows in Table   3 . The first column shows the results for the change in the small business loan portfolio share (measured relative to assets). Both the squared share rise difference and the squared share fall difference have estimated coefficients that are of the predicted sign and significant at the 1 percent level or better.
For those merger observations that result in an initial rise in the small business loan portfolio share of the acquirer (the target bank's small business loan portfolio share is larger than that of the acquirer), the squared share rise difference has a negative coefficient, indicating that the small business loan portfolio share of the consolidated bank tends to decline during the period following the merger (that is, the end-of-subperiod value for the consolidated bank's small business loan portfolio share will be lower than the force-merged value of the share measured at the beginning of the one-year subperiod). Thus, it appears that, subsequent to an acquisition, acquirers do tend to partially offset the merger-induced positive shock to their small business loan portfolio share by reducing their small business loan portfolio concentration.
For those observations in which the merger results in an initial fall in the small business loan portfolio share of the acquirer, that is, the acquirer had a larger share of small business loans than its target bank(s), the acquirers tend to increase their small business loan portfolio share subsequent to the merger. Again, this supports the hypothesis that acquirer banks tend to partially offset a merger-induced shock to their small business loan portfolio share.
With respect to the other explanatory variables, only six have significant estimated effects. Bank size (the logarithm of beginning-of-subperiod total assets) has a negative effect that is highly significant. Not only do larger banks tend to have, on average, a smaller portfolio share of small business loans, but their share tends to grow more slowly (shrink faster). Also, a higher leverage ratio, a larger share of nonperforming loans, a higher return on assets, and a higher loans-to-assets ratio each slow the growth in the small business loan portfolio share. The time dummy variable for the June 1994 to June 1995 subperiod has a positive and significant estimated effect, indicating greater growth, on average, in the second one-year subperiod of the three-year sample compared to the first.
Column 2 shows the results with the change in the volume of small business loans, scaled by total assets, as the dependent variable. The signs on the estimated coefficients of the mergerrelated variables are again as predicted, but only one of the two coefficients is significant at the 1 percent level, while the other is significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, these results also suggest that, subsequent to a merger, acquirers tend to offset the merger-induced shock to their small business loan portfolio shares. As in the case of the regression shown in the first column, the estimated coefficient on the logarithm of assets is negative and highly significant, indicating less growth in small business loans at larger institutions. Among the other explanatory variables, again the leverage ratio, the nonperforming loans ratio, the loans-to-assets ratio, and the second subperiod dummy variable are each significant, although the sign on the loans-to-assets ratio is now positive. In addition, coefficients on contemporaneous employment growth, lagged employment growth, and the dummy variables for being in an urban location and being in the third subperiod are positive and significant. On the other hand, the return on assets no longer has a significant effect. Table 5 splits the bank sample between acquirer banks with less than 10 percent and those with more than 10 percent of their assets in small business loans. When the small business loan portfolio share of the target bank(s) exceeds that of the acquirer, the coefficient on squared share rise difference is always negative and is significant in three of the four equations. This implies that acquirers tend to reduce their small business lending to make the portfolio share of the consolidated bank more closely resemble the pre-merger share of the acquirer. However, the coefficients are larger and more significant for the set of acquirer banks that are less specialized in small business loans. Among the control variables, several interesting patterns emerge. If the bank is part of a multibank holding company, banks in the set of less specialized acquirers tended to raise their small business lending concentration, while more specialized lenders were more likely to reduce their small business lending. Furthermore, the negative impact of the nonperforming loans ratio is much greater for the set of banks with a small business loan specialization greater than 10 percent, the latter being consistent with the acquirer using the merger to diversify away from one of its current areas of specialization. Bank size has a negative and highly significant effect for both specialized and non-specialized borrowers, although the estimated effects are much larger if the acquirer is specialized. Similarly, the return on assets has a much larger effect and the leverage ratio has a much smaller effect on the less specialized set of banks.
The equations shown in Table 6 split the bank sample along another dimension, bank size, between those with assets less than $100 million and those with assets greater than $100 million.
For the set of small banks, acquirers exhibited a strong tendency to revert to their pre-merger small business loan portfolio shares. When the acquirer's small business loan portfolio share was smaller than that of its target(s), the squared share rise difference variable had a negative coefficient that was significant at the 1 percent level for changes in the small business loan portfolio share (column 1) and negative, but not significant, for changes in the volume of small business loans scaled by assets (column 2). When the acquirer had a larger small business loan portfolio share than its target(s), both coefficients for the squared share fall difference variable were positive and highly significant, indicating that the acquirer raised the amount of its small business lending concentration.
For the banks with more than $100 million in assets, which on average increased small business lending much less than banks with assets under $100 million, the reversion in the small business loan portfolio share towards the acquirer's pre-merger share occurs only if the acquirer has a smaller portfolio share than its target(s). Thus, these large banks tended to shrink their concentration on small business lending subsequent to a merger. On the other hand, the coefficient estimates indicate no tendency for these large banks to raise their small business lending in response to a merger-induced decline in their small business loan portfolio share.
We should not expect to observe a strong tendency for acquirer banks to offset merger-induced shocks to their small business loan portfolio shares across the board. For example, if the degree of specialization of the target is very similar to that of the acquirer or if the target bank is very small relative to the size of the acquirer, the merger-induced shock to the acquirer's small business loan portfolio share will be quite small. In that case, the consolidated bank will have little to offset and it is likely that any subsequent change in its small business loan portfolio share will be quite small and may be dominated by other factors (noise) rather than by a meaningful shock to which an acquirer might react. Thus, it might be more informative to isolate the subsample of mergers in which one might expect to observe a systematic response by an acquirer to a merger-induced shock to its small business loan portfolio share. Table 7 shows the results of reestimating the regression with a merger sample including only those mergers where the pre-merger targets, this suggests that not all mergers will shrink small business lending; many will actually raise it. However, it does appear that the tendency for banks to shrink their small business lending to offset a merger-induced rise is somewhat more robust across the many alternative sample splits than is the case for those acquirers that absorb merger-induced declines in their small business loan portfolio shares. On the other hand, the significant negative effect of bank size is particularly robust across all alternative specifications, indicating that larger banks tend to shrink (grow more slowly) their small business loan concentrations, in addition to having, on average, a smaller degree of specialization compared to smaller banks.
IV. Conclusion
Concern with the potential effect of bank mergers on small business lending has stemmed from a belief that large acquirers may be less receptive than their target banks to being active in the small business lending market. We do find that acquirers tend to partially offset a merger-induced change in their small business loan portfolio share subsequent to a merger. However, mergers frequently raise the small business lending of the consolidated bank, because many mergers do not fit the stereotypical view of a large bank with few small business loans acquiring a much smaller target with a large portfolio share of small business loans. We find that acquirer banks tend to have a greater degree of specialization in small business lending than non-acquirers of the same size. We also find that large acquirer banks increased small business lending somewhat more than nonacquirer banks. Furthermore, acquirers in roughly half the mergers had a larger small business loan portfolio share than their target banks and increased their small business loans after the merger in roughly half the cases.
After controlling for other relevant factors, the regression results support the hypothesis that acquirer banks tend to alter their small business lending in order to partially offset the merger-induced shock to their portfolio share of small business loans. When banks are relatively specialized in small business lending or when the acquirer is small, this is especially true.
Thus, while larger banks have increased their small business lending less rapidly than small banks over the past three years and in general large acquirers are less active small business lenders than small acquirers, nonetheless many large acquirers have specialized in small business lending and have increased their portfolio share of small business loans after mergers. The fact that a merger occurs, or that an acquirer is much larger than its target, is not sufficient to determine the proclivity of the consolidated bank to engage in small business lending after the merger. The degree to which the acquirer bank has already committed to small business lending is an important determinant of its likelihood to continue to do so after the merger.
However, one must be cautious about projecting these results to the future. The empirical work is based on only three years of data, so only short-term implications can be explored until additional observations have been accumulated. Furthermore, the significant changes in the legal and industrial structure of the banking industry, particularly with the removal of restrictions on interstate branching and the likely reduction in GlassSteagall Act restrictions, might alter the nature of bank mergers in the future.
1. The small business loan data in the Call Reports are categorized by size of loan, rather than the size of the business borrower. However, for small loan sizes, it is likely that using the size of the loan to define small business lending is satisfactory.
2. Here, we analyze only total bank small business lending, although the bank Call Reports do split business loans into commercial and industrial loans and nonfarm, nonresidential loans. The latter category is distinguished by the use of real estate as collateral for the business loan.
3. Because this is a new survey, bank responses may have suffered from being on the early portion of a learning curve. In fact, Berger and Udell (1996) find inconsistencies between the small business loan survey data in the Call Reports and the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending data. In particular, they find that banks answering the question as to whether all or substantially all of their nonfarm, nonresidential real estate loans and commercial and industrial loans had original amounts of $100,000 or less may have answered in terms of number of loans rather than volume of loans, as intended. However, this explanation accounts for only a portion of the general under-reporting of original amounts found by Berger and Udell (1996) . Furthermore, the underreporting is much more important for the smaller loan sizes. The small loan data have also been scrutinized, identifying what appear to be egregious errors. In particular, the small loan data have been checked by calculating the average size of small business loans in each size category for each bank to ensure that it did not exceed the maximum size of the loan category, and by comparing the total reported small business loans to the total loans reported for both C&I loans and nonfarm, nonresidential real estate loans for each bank.
Because of potential problems using the first year of the survey, we recalculated Tables 1 and 2 and reestimated our regressions excluding the data based on first year of the survey. The results indicated similar qualitative results whether or not the first year is included. Because eliminating the first year reduces the sample by a third, and because the results are qualitatively similar, we report the results using the entire sample.
4. Federal and state laws, as well as internal bank guidelines, limit lending to individual borrowers. For example, for national Endnotes banks, the lending limit for loans that are not fully secured is 15 percent of the bank's unimpaired capital and surplus. These loan concentration limits are likely to be binding on most small banks.
5. The identification of de novo banks is complicated by the fact that de novo entry does not account for all of the instances in which a bank enters the set of commercial and savings banks. Charter changes and new entities formed from the acquisition and merger of all or part of existing institutions also account for a large number of new commercial and savings banks.
6. For example, if Bank A is acquired and merged into Bank B in 1993:III, which is in turn acquired and merged into Bank C in 1994:I, the 1994:II portfolio data for the surviving (consolidated) Bank C must be compared to the sum of the 1993:II data for Bank A, Bank B, and Bank C. If an acquirer merges with more than one target bank during a subperiod, target bank size is measured as the a average asset size of the targets acquired during the subperiod.
If an acquirer merges with more than one target bank during a subperiod, the target bank small business loan b portfolio share is calculated as the ratio of the sum of small business loans held by the targets to the sum of target bank assets. The numbers in parentheses reflect the set of nonaffiliate mergers.
a If an acquirer merges with more than one target bank during a subperiod, target bank size is measured as the b average asset size of the targets acquired during the subperiod.
If an acquirer merges with more than one target bank during a subperiod, the target bank small business loan c portfolio share is calculated as the ratio of the sum of small business loans held by the targets to the sum of target bank assets. The regressions in Columns 2 and 3 omit those merger observations that have a value for share rise a difference or share fall difference greater than 10 percentage points in absolute value.
Each equation also includes a set of Federal Reserve District dummy variables. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level.
